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Articles
RACIAL INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
SEGREGATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Michelle Adams*
“Racial isolation” itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation
is.1
A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that
a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.2

INTRODUCTION
For more than a generation, much of the legal scholarship
concerning the underpinnings and aims of the equal protection
clause has centered on a debate between “anti-subordination”
and “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation.” For some time,
these twin themes have animated the discussion about equal
protection law. On the anti-classification or anti-differentiation
view, the equal protection clause protects against government
action that classifies on the basis of race or that otherwise
3
differentiates on the basis of race. An anti-classification view
emphasizes discrimination, and is primarily concerned with
individual versus group rights, and the particular motivations of
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Co-Director,
Floerscheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy. I would like to thank Thomas
Healy, Rachel Godsil and Robin Lenhardt for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. Thanks to Jason Starr for outstanding research assistance.
1. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 963 (5th ed. 2006) (the ‘anti-classification’ approach “prohibits
certain kinds of classifications, which are assumed by their nature to be invidious.”);
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) (arguing that under the “anti-differentiation perspective, it is
inappropriate to treat individuals differently on the basis of a particular normative view
about race or sex”).

1
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4

the government actor in taking the complained-of action. The
anti-classification or anti-differentiation perspective has largely
been associated with a narrower interpretation of the equal
protection clause, one that would tend to reject affirmative
action programs.
On the other hand, the anti-subordination view emphasizes
that the equal protection clause protects against government
action which “helps sustain or reinforce unjust forms of social
5
hierarchy or social subordination.” The anti-subordination view
emphasizes groups rather than individuals, is concerned with
social status and racial hierarchies and argues that the equal
protection clause should be interpreted to prevent an unjust
6
social structure. The anti-subordination view has largely been
associated with a broader interpretation of the scope of the
equal protection clause, one that would countenance affirmative
action schemes.
However, the Court has never explicitly articulated its
acceptance of the anti-subordination approach. On the other
hand, the Court has expressly adopted the anti-classification
view and it refers to the need to root out racial classification
7
schemes routinely in equal protection cases. To be sure, many of
the Court’s cases can be explained by reference to anti8
subordination values. But only in the few instances where the
9
Court has spoken directly to the evils of “white supremacy” or
explained how racially separate public schools create feelings “of
10
inferiority as to their status in the community” do we have
more direct evidence of the Court’s adoption of an antisubordination approach.
Conversely, the Court has often spoken explicitly about the
evils of racial segregation as distinct from the harms associated
with racial classification schemes. In some contexts, the Court
4. Colker, supra note 3, at 1005 (describing the anti-differentiation view as an individual rights perspective because it “focuses on the motivation of the individual
institution that has allegedly discriminated, without attention to the larger societal
context in which the institution operates,” and, second, because it “focuses on the specific
effect of the alleged discrimination on discrete individuals, rather than on groups”).
5. BREST ET AL., supra note 3.
6. See id.
7. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anti-Classification or Anti-Subordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 13 (2003) (arguing
that “antisubordination values have played and continue to play a key role in shaping
what the anticlassification principle means in practice”).
8. See id. at 11–12.
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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has acknowledged that segregation operates as a particularly
effective mechanism of exclusion, separating individuals on the
basis of race and preventing them from having access to
opportunity. Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the Court
“cares” about racial segregation because it is a strong marker for
exclusion. Has the Court always displayed concern about
segregation as a mechanism of exclusion? No. Segregation’s
status and constitutional relevance is the subject of great debate
on the Court. But the Court’s view of segregation has not been
monolithic. This Article argues that the Court has evidenced far
more concern about de facto segregation as an exclusionary and
stigmatizing mechanism than many scholars and commentators
recognize. As it turns out, a very specific type of antisubordination value often animates the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence: a concern about the corrosive effects of de facto
racial segregation.
This argument is not just of historical import. Instead, the
Court’s perception of the harms of segregation will play a large
role in determining the continuing constitutional vitality of
affirmative action in higher education. Indeed, the Court is
11
poised to revisit its decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, which
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative
action program. In a recent and widely followed case, Fisher v.
12
University of Texas, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit relied upon Grutter to uphold the University of
Texas’ affirmative action program against a constitutional
13
challenge. But in a special concurrence, Judge Emilio M. Garza
urged the Supreme Court to overturn its decision in Grutter v.
14
Bollinger. The Court has granted certiorari in Fisher and the
ultimate outcome will almost certainly hinge on whether the
Court still believes that affirmative action programs serve
broadly inclusive, non-segregative ends or whether such programs are simply so divisive that they cannot comport with the
equal protection clause.
In Part I of the Article, I examine early cases in which the
Court described segregation as a form of resource “lock-up.” In
several cases leading up to Brown, the Court detailed how racial
segregation allows a more dominant group to hoard substantial
11. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345).
13. Id. at 217.
14. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
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societal resources. In these early cases, the Court’s focus was on
segregation as a mechanism for excluding individuals from
valuable benefits on the basis of race; it did not speak explicitly
to the harms associated with racial classification schemes. In this
Part of the Article, I also return to Brown v. Board of Education
and explore the Court’s discussion of segregation and its link to
psychological harm and status diminution. As in several of the
cases leading up to Brown, the Court does not speak explicitly to
the evils of racial classification schemes. Brown still stands as a
sharp critique of the evils of segregation.
In Part II, I explore how the Court has sometimes used de
facto segregation as evidence of de jure discrimination in school
districts that had been (but were no longer) segregated by law.
In the South at least, the fact of segregation in the public schools
triggered an affirmative duty to desegregate even when the
public school districts were not necessarily responsible for that
segregation. In this Part, I also trace Brown’s journey North. I
15
offer an interpretation of Milliken v. Bradley II, which
emphasizes the Court’s deep discomfort with segregation and
links its dismay with the social stratification and racial stigma
associated with segregation. This Part ends with a reading of the
Court’s later Brown implementation cases, which refused to
adopt Justice Thomas’ narrow view of the meaning of
“segregation.”
In Part III, I shift to the voting rights context and discuss
16
how the Court in Shaw v. Reno viewed a districting scheme
which explicitly segregated voters by race into separate electoral
districts as a particularly virulent form of racial classification. In
Shaw, the Court is concerned not just with racial classification
schemes that infect the political process, but it is also concerned
with how racial segregation undermines the political process. As
I explain, Shaw’s central claim is that segregation, not just racial
classification schemes, harms the polity. The lesson of Parts I, II
and III of this Article is that while the Court’s understanding
and concern about segregation is often contradictory and
dismissive, it is also far more nuanced than commonly
appreciated. Segregation can “move” the Court when it
explicitly stands as a marker of exclusion.

15. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
16. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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Finally, in Part IV, I discuss Grutter v. Bollinger. In
Grutter, the Court held that the government could use racial
classifications to enhance racial diversity. Grutter embraced
racial integration as a mode of facilitating racial inclusion.
Grutter has links to previous cases in which the Court
demonstrated a deep and abiding concern about the stigmatizing
and racially exclusionary aspects of segregation. But in Parents
Involved, the Court appeared to step back from Grutter’s more
enthusiastic endorsement of racial integration. Grutter’s
continuing viability will turn on whether the Court views
affirmative action as playing a divisive, balkanizing and
exclusionary role in American life or instead on whether the
Court sees affirmative action as playing a broad inclusionary and
18
desegregative role in American life.
I. SEGREGATION AND RESOURCE “LOCK-UPS”
At various points, the Court has characterized segregation
as a form of exclusion. In several cases decided prior to Brown,
the Court described the harm associated with segregation as a
type of “resource lock-up.” Take McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
19
Regents for Higher Education. In McLaurin, a student was
admitted to a state graduate program in education, but
20
segregated from his peers within the school. Rather than focus
on the harm created by the state’s classification scheme which
required intra-school segregation, the Court focused on how
segregation harmed McLaurin’s ability to study and learn his
21
profession. The Court noted that the segregation requirement
22
“sets McLaurin apart from the other students,” which had the
effect of preventing him from gaining access to a valuable
resource on the same terms as white students, a doctorate in
education.

17. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
18. See Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1284 (2011) (arguing that a
“framework attentive to concerns of balkanization captures concerns moving the center
of the Court more faithfully than one focused solely on the conventional distinction
between anticlassification and antisubordination.”).
19. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
20. Id. at 640. At the time the case was decided, McLaurin was “assigned to a seat
in the classroom in a row specified for colored students; he is assigned to a table in the
library on the main floor; and he is permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as
other students, although here again he is assigned to a special table.” Id.
21. Id. at 641.
22. Id.
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Another way of stating this is to suggest that a valuable
resource, graduate study, was being reserved to members of the
dominant group and members of the disfavored group were
excluded from equal access to that resource; McLaurin suggests
23
that that resource must be shared. Indeed, the Court previewed
a theme that was to become dominant in Grutter almost three
generations later: the relationship between higher education and
societal leadership. The Court observed that as our society grows
increasingly complex, the “need for trained leaders increases
24
correspondingly.” The Court asserted that individuals attaining
advanced degrees would become leaders in their communities
25
and trainers of others. But McLaurin’s ability to perform this
vital leadership function would be fatally undermined by a
26
racially segregated education.
That resource lock-up theme was even more pronounced in
27
Sweatt v. Painter. In Sweatt, the state of Texas created a
separate law school for blacks in order to come into compliance
28
with the equal protection clause as then interpreted. The
question for the Court was whether the separate black law
school was “substantially equal” to the all-white University of
29
Texas Law School. The Court said no, but not just because the
two schools lacked substantial equality based on the difference
in the number of books in the library or credentials of the
teaching staff. To be sure, the Court compared the two
educational programs with respect to the baseline requirements
necessary for an adequate legal education: competent faculty,
course offerings, law library, law review and other extracurricular activities. Based upon its comparison of these tangible
factors alone the Court found that the “University of Texas Law

23. Along these lines, Daria Roithmayr has described historical racial discrimination from an anti-competitive perspective. See Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16
MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 48 (2010) (arguing that under a Jim Crow régime all-white
groups often functioned as racial cartels and “gained significant social, economic and
political profit—higher wages, higher property values, greater political power—from
excluding on the basis of race”).
24. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
28. Id. at 632. The narrow issue decided by the Court was whether the legal
education offered to blacks within the state of Texas was “equivalent to that offered by
the State to students of other races.” Id. at 635.
29. Id. at 633–34.
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30

School is superior” and thus it could have ended its substantial
equality analysis there.
But the Court’s analysis continued. Instead, the Court
measured equality in a more nuanced way. As many commentators have noted, the Court emphasized the “intangible”
differences between the University of Texas Law School and the
31
“new law school for Negroes.” The Court’s analysis focused on
the structural differences between the two educational programs.
The Court discussed those qualities that “make for greatness in a
32
Those qualities were prestige, influence,
law school.”
reputation, and traditions, “intangibles” in the sense that they
resist standard empirical measurement. Stated another way, the
Court’s analysis focused on how the University of Texas Law
School provided certain resource and status benefits to white
students that simply were not available to black students,
notwithstanding the adequacy of any parallel legal program open
to them. What is perhaps most important about this line of
analysis is that the Court had no trouble with the idea that status
benefits and resources are real rather than imagined, and that
33
they provide enormous benefits to white students.
Prior to Sweatt, of course, such status benefits had been the
subject of a “lockup,” meaning that they were reserved solely to
white students. Again, there is no discussion in the case of the
harms associated with the state’s racial classification scheme
which mandated separate education for blacks and whites in
higher education. Instead, the Court engages in a dissertation on
the harms associated with segregation, of what happens when a
dominant group reserves to itself certain kinds of resources and
benefits solely to individuals on the basis of their race. One
argument is that those benefits, particularly as the Court
discussed them in connection with reputation and the strength of
the school’s alumni, have a “feedback loop” effect. The longer
the benefit is reserved to white students, the greater the value of
the benefit, the more societal power is accreted to the dominant

30. Id.
31. Id. at 633.
32. Id. at 634.
33. Along these lines, see Amy Stuart Wells, The “Consequences” of School
Desegregation: The Mismatch Between the Research and the Rationale, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 771, 775 (2001) (“The Sweatt and McLaurin decisions rested on the
negative effect of black students’ exclusion from white institutions not simply because of
the resources or facilities in these institutions, but also because of their status in society
as well as the social networks of faculty and students within them.”).
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group and the more that dominant group becomes identified
34
with that benefit.
And indeed a secondary theme in Sweatt is the Court’s
discussion of the negative effects of racial exclusion, the core of
the harm of segregation. Exclusion from the University of Texas
Law School harmed black students not just because that
exclusion is mandated under a scheme that classifies individuals
on the basis of a phenotypical characteristic. Instead, the black
law school sets prospective black lawyers apart and is conducted
in a legal vacuum. It is “removed from the interplay of ideas and
35
the exchange of views with which the law is concerned,” and
thus could not adequately prepare black lawyers to function in a
professional world where interaction with white clients and
judges was expected. This line of argumentation, of course,
anticipated the Court’s later discussion of the importance of
viewpoint diversity in both Bakke and Grutter, but with one key
difference. In Bakke and Grutter, the Court was willing to look
at the totality of the law school experience for all law students;
those cases opined that homogeneity undermines the law school
experience for everyone. In Sweatt, the Court’s discussion of
racial exclusion is more specific; how segregated professional
education harms the ability of black lawyers to do their job.
Indeed, the Court has made the connection between
segregation and resource lock-ups outside of the race context. In
36
United States v. Virginia, the Court considered an equal
protection challenge to the Virginia Military Institute’s maleonly admissions policy. As in Sweatt, the state created a separate
program for women in an attempt to come into compliance with
37
the equal protection clause. But the Court ruled that the
parallel program, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership,
did not provide a comparable single-gender educational
experience and thus it did not provide an adequate remedy for
38
the underlying constitutional violation. The Court’s heavy
reliance on Sweatt is notable. In analyzing why the VMIL was
34. For an analysis of how negative feedback loops shape current residential segregation, see Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 197
(2004) “[During Jim Crow,] white racial cartels . . . engaged in anti-competitive conduct
to exclude blacks and monopolize access to good neighborhoods.” Roithmayr asserts that
that advantage has become “locked-in via certain self-reinforcing neighborhoods effects,
namely through public school finance and neighborhood job referral networks.”).
35. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.
36. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
37. Id. at 525–26.
38. Id. at 552–54.
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not comparable to VMI, the Court reviewed Sweatt in detail, and
reiterated the importance of the intangibles in the comparability
analysis. The entire thrust of the Court’s discussion of VMIL
centers on the harms associated with exclusion, that is
segregation not the gender classification scheme itself. The
problem with the VMIL was that it was not equal to VMI in
terms of tangibles (course offerings and curricular choices). But
more importantly VMIL lacked the “faculty stature, funding,
39
prestige, alumni support and influence,” those things incapable
40
of objective measurement.
A. SEGREGATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM AND STATUS
DIMINUTION
The basis of the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of
41
Education has been much debated. The standard and widely
accepted view is that Brown is open to several varying and
42
potentially inconsistent interpretations. But there can be little
doubt that Brown stands for the proposition, at least in part, that
state-mandated racial segregation violates the equal protection
clause because it causes psychological harm and sends the
message that blacks are inferior to whites. The debate, of course,
centers on the question of whether it is the segregation itself that
created such harms or the fact that such segregation was
required by state law.
My argument here will not end this debate. I will simply
observe that there is no discussion in Brown of racial
classification schemes or of the harms that such schemes might
cause. Instead, the Court explained explicitly how segregation
creates psychological damage (separation “generates a feeling of
43
inferiority” which affects black students’ “hearts and minds”),
facilitates status diminution (separation “denot[es] the
44
inferiority of the negro group”), and excludes blacks from
educational opportunities afforded only to white students
(education is the “very foundation of good citizenship” and thus
45
“must be made available to all on equal terms”). Indeed, the
39. Id. at 553.
40. Id. at 554 (citing Sweatt, 359 U.S. at 634).
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 508–09 (17th ed. 2010) (noting four possible interpretations of Brown: colorblindness, caste, white supremacy and integration).
43. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 493.
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Court implied that racial segregation even in the absence of state
compunction causes harm, “‘segregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
46
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”
47
Bolling v. Sharpe dealt with the constitutionality of racial
segregation in the District of Columbia public schools, therefore
48
the equal protection clause did not apply. In Bolling, the Court
articulated a theme that had been absent in Brown and which
was to take on increasing importance: that racial classification
schemes are inherently suspect and thus should receive some
49
form of heightened scrutiny. But while Bolling articulated the
idea that a heightened level of judicial review ought to apply to
racial classification schemes, it is not clear that the Court
actually applied that standard to the race-based segregation
scheme at issue. Instead, the Court stated that segregation “in
public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus imposes on Negro children of
the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
50
deprivation of their liberty . . . .” This wording is strange if what
the Court was doing was applying something approaching strict
scrutiny review to a racial classification scheme. The language
instead seems to be more consistent with the application of
“rational basis” or a more deferential standard of review.
If that is the case, why was segregation not reasonably
related to any proper governmental objective? Surely the
government could argue that the need to segregate the races is
rationally related to some legitimate government objective, such
51
as protecting the public health or welfare. It is not clear exactly
why the Court rejects this view, but one answer seems to lie in
Brown. In Bolling, the Court simply says it would be
“unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser

46. Id. at 494 (emphasis supplied).
47. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
48. Id. at 499. Bolling has typically been explained as an example of “reverse
incorporation” with the Court incorporating the obligations of the equal protection
clause as against the federal government through the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 915.
49. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (“Classifications based solely upon race must be
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.”).
50. Id. at 500.
51. See Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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52

duty on the Federal Government.” If we are to assume that the
due process and equal protection clauses impose similar duties
on the states and the federal government, the Court’s primary
explication of that duty comes out of Brown. And as discussed
above, there is good reason to believe that the Brown Court was
independently concerned about the harms of segregation and its
negative impact on African-Americans. In this sense, the Bolling
Court incorporates Brown’s reasoning as against the federal
government as well.
II. DE FACTO SEGREGATION AS EVIDENCE OF DE
JURE DISCRIMINATION
The Court has also used segregation as evidence of de jure
53
discrimination. Take Green v. New Kent County School Board.
That case concerned the question of whether a formerly de jure
segregated school system’s adoption of a freedom of choice plan
allowing black and white students to choose which school to
attend impermissibly perpetuated an unconstitutional dual
54
school system. In Green, the Court ruled that school districts
formerly operating dual school systems have an affirmative duty
“to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
55
eliminated root and branch.” The Court found that the freedom
of choice plan was ineffective because even after three years of
operation “85% of the Negro children in the system still attend
56
the all-Negro Watkins school.” The thrust of the Court’s ruling
was that New Kent County was still operating a dual school
system and thus was in violation of Brown because the schools
were racially monolithic. This was the case even though the state
law no longer required that the schools be racially segregated.
Green is famous for the “affirmative duty” doctrine and it
put to rest the idea that school districts had no obligation to take
affirmative steps to desegregate their school systems. Under
Green, Brown I plus Brown II equals the requirement to
57
transition to a “racially nondiscriminatory school system.” But
under the logic of Green, a racially nondiscriminatory school
system could not include a system where 85% of the black
52. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
53. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
54. Id. at 431–32.
55. Id. at 437–38.
56. Id. at 441.
57. Id. at 437.
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children still attended the same school they had attended prior
to the Brown decision. Under Green, the remedy for state
imposed segregation is desegregation, and the evidence of
whether the school district had come into compliance with
Brown is continuing racial segregation in the school district. In
Green, there is no discussion of “racial identifiability” or of the
“racially monolithic” nature of the schools. Instead, Green
considered the schools “segregated” on a continuing violation
theory even in the absence of a racial classification scheme, just
as the schools were “segregated” in Brown.
Similarly in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
58
Education, the Court ruled that in a public school system with a
history of de jure segregation there is a “presumption against
schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial
59
composition.” Segregation was a form of proof that the
underlying constitutional violation had not been remedied.
Swann firmly placed the burden on school districts to
demonstrate why substantial disproportionality in racial
60
composition was not the result of prior de jure segregation. Of
course, at the same time the Court articulated the de facto-de
jure distinction; the obligations of the equal protection clause
only extended to segregation that could be traced to state law or
61
other purposeful, official action. De facto segregation,
segregation that could be attributed to other more remote
factors or private action, was not within the purview of the equal
62
protection clause.
To be sure, the de facto-de jure distinction was (and is) a
63
huge impediment to desegregation. As some members of the
Court recognized, de facto segregation was often caused by state
actors and the difficulty of ascertaining causation or assigning
responsibility to a specific state actor should not constrain the
64
reach of the equal protection clause. Justice Douglas’ blunt
58. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
59. Id. at 26.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 17–18; see also Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S.
189, 208 (1973) (“[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called
de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate.”).
62. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31–32 (1971).
63. BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 936 (noting that “as the South began to integrate
after 1968, Northern schools still remained largely segregated, leading to charges of
unfairness by Southern politicians who felt that the federal courts were singling them out.
Northern segregation was often the result of what was described as ‘de facto’ rather than
‘de jure’ segregation”).
64. See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If a ‘neighborhood’
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assessment still holds true: “there is no constitutional difference
between de jure and de facto segregation, for each is the product
65
of state actions or policies.” The Court simply refused to
acknowledge this fact. But one point bears mentioning that
might suggest a more nuanced approach to the Court’s
understanding of segregation. The de facto-de jure distinction
was largely a regional dichotomy. As Justice Powell observed in
his concurring opinion in Keyes, the Court had little interest in
66
policing the de facto-de jure distinction in the South. By 1973, it
was hard to argue that 100% of the racial identifiability in public
schools in large, metropolitan areas of the South was attributable
solely to discriminatory state laws that had been invalidated by
Brown a generation before. Many of those schools were racially
monolithic, but not necessarily for reasons that could be clearly
traced to state laws requiring racial segregation.
Moreover, some of the racial identifiability in those schools
67
was clearly attributable to private action. The schools in the
metropolitan South were racially monolithic for the same
reasons that they were racially monolithic in the metropolitan
North: “segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact
of which on the racial composition of the schools was often
perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public school
68
authorities.” Yet under the affirmative duty doctrine, Southern
school authorities had a duty to ameliorate this kind of
segregation, too. But absent a showing of discriminatory purpose
underlying racially identifiable schools, Northern school
authorities bore no such affirmative duty to desegregate. In the
South, segregation was both evidence of an ongoing violation of
the equal protection clause and signaled an affirmative duty to
cure even though some of that segregation was not caused by
or ‘geographical’ unit has been created along racial lines by reason of the play of
restrictive covenants that restrict certain areas to ‘the elite,’ leaving the ‘undesirables’ to
move elsewhere, there is state action in the constitutional sense because the force of law
is placed behind those covenants.”).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In imposing on metropolitan southern
school districts an affirmative duty, entailing large scale transportation of pupils, to
eliminate segregation in the schools, the Court required these districts to alleviate
conditions which in large part did not result from historic, state-imposed de jure
segregation.”).
67. Id. at 222–23 (Powell, J. concurring) (asserting that “the familiar root cause of
segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the
same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the
racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action
of public school authorities”) (emphasis supplied).
68. Id. at 222–23 (Powell, J., concurring).
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discriminatory state laws and could be attributed to private
action.
The standard narrative about the de facto-de jure distinction
as a regional dichotomy is that the Court was punishing the
“guilty” South, while allowing an often virulently racist North to
69
go free. To be sure, this amounted to a double standard and
desegregation in the North was far harder to achieve because of
70
it. But it is worth remembering that at least in the Southern
context, the Court was willing to place significant obligations on
school authorities for segregation that they may not have caused,
even as racial classification schemes mandating segregation
receded into history. Green converted Brown’s injunction
71
against discrimination into an “affirmative duty to integrate,” in
situations where all of the observable segregation could not be
attributed to school authorities. In the South, the Court’s
concern about the harms of segregation transcended at least for
a time its commitment to a pure anti-classification view of the
equal protection clause.
A. SEGREGATION AS A FORM OF EXCLUSION
72
Brown’s journey North was indeed troubled. First in Keyes
and then in a series of later cases, the Court significantly
73
constrained Brown remedies in the North and ultimately
curtailed federal district courts’ ongoing jurisdiction over
74
desegregation cases. In these cases, the Court balked at the
invitation to extend the Brown mandate nationally and lost
patience with aggressive federal court enforcement of
desegregation decrees, particularly if those courts sought to
retain jurisdiction in perpetuity. These two drivers, combined
with the Court’s renewed emphasis on federalism and its own
institutional legitimacy, drove the Court’s increasing sense of
desegregation exhaustion. And yet even in this line of cases, the

69. BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 936.
70. See id.
71. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing Green as a “drastic
expansion” of Brown).
72. Id. at 208–09 (reifying the de facto-de jure distinction and absolving school
authorities from any obligation to come into compliance with Brown in the North and
West absent a finding of discriminatory purpose).
73. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken
I).
74. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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Court’s view of segregation was more nuanced than commonly
appreciated.
75
Take the Milliken v. Bradley cases, which are generally
considered to be the low watermark in terms of the Court’s
76
commitment to integration. In Milliken I, there was no dispute
that the state of Michigan had engaged in de jure segregation in
77
the City of Detroit. The question in Milliken I was what was the
78
appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation. Because
the City of Detroit was overwhelmingly black, the lower federal
courts instituted an interdistrict desegregation plan, which used
the predominantly white suburban schools as a desegregation
79
resource in order to cure the constitutional violation. In
Milliken I, the Court ruled interdistrict busing was impermissible
to achieve integration unless the defendant committed an
interdistrict violation: “where the racially discriminatory acts of
one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately
80
drawn on the basis of race.” The outcome in Milliken I was
simple yet devastating: no interdistrict violation, no interdistrict
remedy. Because of the largely racially segregated nature of
large metropolitan areas in the North and West and the difficulty
of proving an interdistrict violation, this typically meant that no
meaningful desegregation plan could be ordered by a federal
81
court.
The Michigan case returned to the Court a second time to
answer the following question: what was the permissible scope of
82
an intradistrict remedy. On the state of Michigan’s view, it
could not be required to remediate segregation’s deleterious
effects on the Detroit public school system except to the extent
75. See supra note 73, and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (GARY
ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON EDS., 1996) 1, 10, 12 (arguing that desegregation in
American schools “hit a stone wall with the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley [I] decision” and
describing Milliken II as providing a “limited form of reparations” that has “not been
implemented successfully”).
77. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 723.
78. Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 739.
80. Id. at 745.
81. See Susan E. Eaton, Joseph Feldman & Edward Kirby, Still Separate, Still
Unequal: The Limits of Milliken II’s Monetary Compensation to Segregated Schools in
ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 143, 143–44 (arguing that in “coming years, Milliken I
would make it all but impossible to achieve racial integration within predominantly
minority school districts”).
82. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 269.

!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

16

5/31/2012 12:04 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:1

83

that they involved pupil placement. Thus, the state took the
narrowest possible view of its remedial responsibility: a finding
of an intradistrict violation against the state qualified the
84
plaintiffs only for a Detroit-only pupil reassignment plan.
This argument, that the state’s responsibility was limited to
student assignment, makes sense if one views Brown as solely
concerned with racial classifications and as agnostic with respect
to the harms associated with segregation. If the constitutional
violation is segregating Detroit public school students “on the
85
basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of”
the State of Michigan, then an appropriate remedy would be a
student assignment plan that provides for the maximum feasible
amount of school desegregation within the city of Detroit.
But the Court rejected this view. It held instead that
Michigan could be forced to pay for remedial and compensatory
programs, magnet schools, additional training for teachers,
administrators, guidance counselors, and for counseling
86
programs and augmented testing procedures. All of these
elements of the remedial plan were intended to ameliorate the
87
effects of the underlying constitutional violation. Milliken II
stands for the proposition that “federal courts can order
remedial education programs as part of a school desegregation
88
decree.”
Milliken II represents a huge retreat from aggressive
desegregation enforcement and is rightly viewed as a significant
89
defeat for racial integration. But what is perhaps less commonly
appreciated is that the Court in Milliken II was still deeply
concerned about the harmful effects of segregation. Indeed, in a
striking passage, the Court expressly detailed how exclusion
from the larger more dominant group can create extreme harm,

83. Id. at 281.
84. Id. at 271. Indeed, the State of Michigan took the position that the 11th
Amendment barred the federal courts from ordering the state to pay the costs of any
compensatory remedial educational programs intended to overcome the effects of de
jure segregation. Id. at 288–89.
85. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 723.
86. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 286–87.
87. Id. at 287.
88. Id. at 279.
89. See Eaton et al., supra note 81, at 145 (arguing that Milliken II remedies “have
evolved not as permanent changes in opportunity structure, but as temporary,
supplemental add-ons that are not linked to any systemic effort to redress harms of
segregation”).
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and offered a structural analysis of the role that segregation
plays in creating inequality:
On this record, however, we are bound to conclude that the
decree before us was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional violation. Children who have
been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the
larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech,
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They
are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary
from the environment in which they must ultimately function
and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that
community. This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it can
affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of
90
law from the mainstream.

The Court’s view of segregation in Milliken II is surprisingly
nuanced and complex. The Court understands segregation and
exclusion to be one in the same, and suggests that exclusion from
the mainstream is an independent and perhaps special kind of
harm. For the Court, segregation simultaneously stigmatizes and
deprives because it sets children “educationally and culturally”
apart from the larger group and inculcates different “habits of
speech, conduct, and attitudes” that reflect cultural isolation.
Segregation also handicaps children in their ability to compete
with other Americans for jobs and other social benefits. The
Court recognizes that this exclusion has a functional, structural
component: when individuals are separated out from the larger
group harm occurs. This exclusionary harm is that much more
amplified when it has the force of race. Indeed, in Milliken II,
the Court comes close to explicitly acknowledging the role that
segregation plays in creating social stratification and
perpetuating a caste system. For the Court, this harm had to be
remediated through a compensatory regime; a Detroit-only
91
student assignment plan would not do. This remedy vastly
undercompensated the harm, but the Court recognized that
harm nonetheless.
There is no question that plaintiffs in Milliken I had the
better of the argument about the appropriate of remedy for de
jure segregation: only an interdistrict remedy could guarantee
meaningful desegregation given the racial composition of the
90. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 287.
91. Eaton et al., supra note 81, at 144 (“Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of
Milliken II was its declaration that states found guilty of prior discrimination must pay
for remedial educational programs.”).
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City of Detroit and surrounding areas. The Court rejected this
view and blessed a Detroit-only remedy. In a sense, the Milliken
cases expose the duality of the Court’s understanding of
segregation. In the Milliken cases, the Court correctly and
powerfully diagnosed the harm: segregation is a powerful mode
of exclusion. But at the same time, it refused to countenance a
meaningful desegregative remedy that would have functioned as
a powerful engine of inclusion. In other contexts, however, the
Court has upheld integrative remedies that transverse local
92
jurisdictional limits.
B. SEGREGATION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM
In some respects, the Milliken cases are emblematic of how
the Court has often viewed segregation. A majority of the Court
views segregation as a significant social problem and as distinct
from the harms associated with racial classifications, but its
concern about segregation manifests in divergent and sometimes
schizophrenic ways. On the one hand, the Court’s later Brown
implementation cases display a deep desire to draw bright-line
distinctions between constitutionally actionable de jure
segregation and constitutionally irrelevant racial imbalances. So
93
for instance, in Freeman v. Pitts, the Court limited the ability of
federal courts to address racial imbalances not causally linked to
state action:
Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of
private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It
is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the
federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous
and massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results
would require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the
courts of school districts simply because they were once de
94
jure segregated.

In Freeman, the Court articulated a bright-line rule: demographic and residential changes leading to racial imbalances
were outside of federal court authority, but racial imbalances
that could be linked to prior de jure discrimination, that is
92. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976) (ruling that Milliken I did
not establish “a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to
have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal
boundaries” and upholding a remedial plan that required the Department of Housing
and Urban Development to take action beyond the boundaries of the City of Chicago).
93. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
94. Id. at 495.
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95

“segregation” were within federal court authority. And just a
96
few years later, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court ruled that a
district court exceeded its remedial authority when it authorized
a desegregation order including major capital improvements,
quality education programs and teacher salary increases for the
purposes of attracting non-minority suburban students to an
urban school district in order to ameliorate an intradistrict rather
97
than an interdistrict constitutional violation. In so doing, the
Court sounded a similar theme: just “as demographic changes
independent of de jure segregation will affect the racial
composition of student assignments, so too will numerous
external factors beyond the control of the [defendants] affect
minority student achievement. So long as these external factors
are not the result of segregation, they do not figure in the
98
remedial calculus.” Thus, in both cases, the Court drew a broad
distinction between racial imbalances (non-constitutionally
actionable predominantly single-race spaces) and segregation
(constitutionally relevant predominantly single-race spaces).
And yet even where the Court issued rulings such as
Freeman and Jenkins which clearly retarded the desegregation
process, it refrained from adopting the view championed by
Justice Thomas that racial imbalances are socially net neutral or
even socially valuable. Consider Justice Thomas’ concurrence in
Jenkins. Justice Thomas’ quarrel was with the district court’s
initial liability determination. On Justice Thomas’ view, in order
for the district court to conclude that the constitution was
violated in the absence of a fresh showing of de jure segregation,
it must have equated the racially isolated nature of the KSMSD
with some sort of harm. But if there was no state action which
created the racially identifiable school district, then the district
court must have assumed that there was something problematic
about the predominantly black composition of the schools
themselves. How else could one explain the district court’s initial
finding of liability when the possibility of de jure segregation was
so remote. Justice Thomas argued, “in effect, the court found
that racial imbalances constituted an ongoing constitutional
violation that continued to inflict harm on black students. This

95. Id. at 496 (“The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a
school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that they
have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied.”).
96. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
97. Id. at 100.
98. Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
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position appears to rest upon the idea that any school that is
black is inferior, and that blacks cannot succeed without the
99
benefit of the company of whites.” Thus, Justice Thomas
asserted that the only way the district court could have
concluded that the defendants violated the constitution was
because it equated majority-black schools with inferiority.
Justice Thomas reasoned that racial imbalances cannot
justify far-ranging desegregation orders, an assumption that is
largely echoed in the majority opinion. But Justice Thomas’
concurrence goes further and captures the essence of the ongoing conversation about segregation on the Court. Justice
Thomas’ point is that courts must draw no negative inference at
all about significant racial imbalances. On Justice Thomas’ view,
in the absence of de jure segregation to make a negative
assumption about racial imbalances employs a “Jim Crow” mode
of thinking. Justice Thomas opined: it “never ceases to amaze
me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is
100
predominantly black must be inferior.” Thus, Justice Thomas’
implication is clear: if de facto segregation is largely the product
of private choice or other voluntary action there is no reason to
believe that racial imbalance is problematic unless, of course,
one is a racist. Justice Thomas would have the Court hold that
racial imbalances are not just constitutionally irrelevant, but are
constitutionally invisible.
But a majority of the Court has not taken this view.
Notwithstanding the Court’s attempt to draw bright-line rules it
is still engaged in a debate about the constitutional implications
of de facto racial segregation. Perhaps this is because segregation
can create harm even without the sanction of state law. That is,
segregation reifies and strengthens the underlying processes of
social categorization, unequal allocation of resources and racial
stigma. Segregation is an extraordinarily effective mechanism for
perpetuating racial and social hierarchy.
Douglas Massey has recently argued that the process of
stratification explains much of the social inequality we currently
101
observe in American society. Massey defines stratification as
the “unequal distribution of people across social categories that
are characterized by differential access to scarce [material,

99. Id. at 118–19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 114.
101. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM (2007).
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102

symbolic, and emotional] resources.” Various stratification
systems or processes exist which order people hierarchically in
our society, with those at the top of the social order having more
103
For Massey, while
access to these scarce resources.
stratification processes vary they “boil down to a combination of
two simple but powerful mechanisms: the allocation of people to
social categories, and the institutionalization of practices that
104
allocate resources unequally across those categories.”
The first component necessary for stratification is social
categorization. In our society, one very powerful way that people
are socially categorized is by race. Historically dark skin—a
highly visible yet morally irrelevant characteristic—is associated
105
with systematic social disadvantages that are very real. Black
Americans are systematically below white Americans across a
106
variety of important social welfare and economic indicia. Thus,
dark skin signals social disadvantage. But at the same time, dark
skin also creates caste-based harm, such as racial stigma and
injury to self-respect. This is the case because when “someone is
a member of a group that is systematically subordinate to others,
and when the group characteristic is highly visible, insults to self107
Indeed,
respect are likely to occur nearly every day.”
individuals possessing the particular characteristic—dark skin—
become defined not as individuals who “happen to be black,”
but as members of a subordinated group where that
characteristic predominates, “black people.” The stigma
associated with such group membership is “what it means to be a
108
member of a lower caste.”
As Robin Lenhardt has explained, racial stigma refers to the
109
negative meanings that we as a society associate with dark skin.
Lenhardt argues that people with dark skin are viewed as less
than fully human and that they are cloaked with a negative
110
“virtual social identity” they do not choose. The virtual social
identity widely ascribed to black people—of criminality,
impetuousness, promiscuity, stupidity, sloth—obscures and
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 5–6.
105. Cass R. Sunstein, The AntiCaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2430 (1994).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2432.
109. R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004).
110. Id. at 816–21.
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sublimates black individuals’ actual identity, undermining
individuality. For Lenhardt, “[r]ace becomes a sort of a mask, a
barrier that both makes it impossible for the stigmatized
person’s true self to be seen and fixes the range of responses that
111
others will have to that person.” Thus, negative social meaning
attaches to those with dark skin in an automatic and unconscious
112
fashion. Widely shared dehumanizing meanings associated
with race operate at a pre-conscious level in ways which trigger
racially discriminatory conduct and racial microaggressions;
exacerbate racial disparities; erode self-esteem; undercut the
ability of black persons to participate fully in community and
governmental processes, and “distort perception and spoil social
interactions between racially stigmatized and nonstigmatized
113
Race is an essential component in social
individuals.”
stratification because it provides the mechanism for categorizing
people into in and out groups, of distinguishing between the
dominant and the subordinate in our social structure.
The second component necessary for stratification is the
unequal allocation of resources between social groups. Unequal
allocation of resources occurs through the processes of
competition, exploitation and opportunity hoarding. In any
social structure, groups will compete for dominance with respect
not only to political power and material resources, but also for
social status, that is “social approval, respect, and admiration for
114
one’s self and one’s style of life . . . .” This is the case because
status correlates with and often produces wealth, political power
115
and other social goods, and because of the limited pool of
116
status benefits. Because status is a relative good, in order for
117
one group to have more another must have less. When social
groups interact—economically, politically, socially—they play an
endless number of interactive “games” with the winning group
achieving status benefits at the losing group’s expense. The
natural outcome to such competition will be status hierarchies,
118
the most extreme of which is a system of race-based caste.
Exploitation “occurs when people in one social group
111. Id. at 819.
112. Id. at 825.
113. Id. at 836–47.
114. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2327 (1997).
115. Id. at 2328 (“Status capital can be converted, though often imperfectly and
unpredictably, into other forms of capital and economic and social power.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2328–29.
118. Id. at 2323, 2358.
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expropriate a resource produced by members of another social
group and prevent them from realizing the full value of their
119
effort in producing it.”
Finally, opportunity hoarding is classic monopolistic
behavior. Opportunity hoarding “occurs when one social group
restricts access to a scarce resource, either through outright
denial or by exercising monopoly control that requires out-group
members to pay rent in return for access. Either way,
opportunity hoarding is enabled through a socially defined
120
process of exclusion.” Now we can appreciate the relationship
among segregation, the mechanics of stratification and the social
meaning of race. Race is socially constructed; it is both a signal
of lower status and a cognitive heuristic triggering negative
social meanings. At the same time, groups endlessly compete for
social status, exploiting resources and exacting monopoly rents
from out-groups. The result is stratification and inequality:
segregation facilitates this entire process.
From this perspective, Justice Thomas’ constitutional
invisibility approach is unpersuasive precisely because it is
woefully underinclusive. One way that segregation harms is
when the state imposes racial separation. But that is not the only
way that segregation creates harm. If segregation is the binding
agent of inequality, then government should be applauded
rather than condemned for attempting to address it. A
constitutional vision which requires state actors to ignore the
harm that de facto segregation can create demands a kind of
constitutional blindness that a majority of the Court has not
countenanced. As discussed in the next Part, the Court often
responds to racial classification schemes that explicitly segregate
as a particularly virulent and problematic form of racial
classification.
III. RACIAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES,
SEGREGATION OR BOTH: TWO READINGS OF
SHAW V. RENO
The harms associated with segregation are not necessarily
the same as the harms associated with racial classification
121
schemes. Shaw v. Reno is illustrative of this view. In Shaw, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a North Carolina
119. MASSEY, supra note 101, at 6 (italics in original).
120. Id.
121. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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reapportionment plan that created two majority-black districts
122
with irregular district boundary lines. The governmental action
at issue, drawing boundary lines “of dramatically irregular
123
shape” was facially race neutral. Typically, facially race-neutral
124
government actions do not violate the equal protection clause.
However, the Court ruled that the redistricting plan was so
bizarre and irregular that it was “unexplainable on grounds
125
other than race,” and thus it “demands the same close scrutiny
126
that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.”
Ultimately, the Court held that the districting plan could only be
viewed “as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race” and thus presumptively violated
127
the equal protection clause.
Of course, one might understand Shaw as a racial
classification case. On this view, the reason why the districting
scheme violated the equal protection clause was because the
government action classified individuals on the basis of their
race by separating them into racially identifiable electoral
districts. In Shaw, the bizarre nature of the district lines
themselves expressed an impermissible and very public racial
128
message. Thus, the Court inferred from the shape of the
districts that the purpose of the redistricting plan was to
129
“segregate voters on the basis of race . . . .” Once the Court
made that inference the redistricting scheme was tantamount to
130
a racial classification and strict scrutiny automatically applied.
On this view, when the Court says there is a right to participate
131
in a “‘color-blind’ electoral process” it means the political
process should not be tainted with racial classification schemes.
But it would be a mistake to view Shaw as solely concerned
with rooting out racial classifications schemes that infect the
political process. In Shaw, the Court also speaks to the harms
associated with segregation in the political process. The

122. Id. at 633–34.
123. Id. at 633.
124. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–
65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976).
125. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 658.
128. Id. at 630, 647 (“[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which
appearances do matter.”) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
129. Id. at 669.
130. Id. at 658.
131. Id. at 641–42.
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government’s action was facially race neutral. Thus, the question
was whether that action was animated by a discriminatory
132
purpose. Shaw holds that intent to segregate is a discriminatory
purpose, whether the government’s motive is to perpetuate
white supremacy or to eradicate past discriminatory harm. Shaw
ruled that even government action designed to benefit members
of historically disadvantaged groups could not be justified
because of the harms associated with segregation. But as I
discuss below, the Court has taken exactly the opposite position
with respect to government action intended to integrate:
sometimes the government may take otherwise constitutionally
impermissible (or at least constitutionally questionable) action
into account in an effort to promote racial integration.
Indeed, Shaw condemns racial segregation in the strongest
possible terms. The Court’s discussion of the harms of the
reapportionment plan focused on the problems of separation
and exclusion in the political process. For instance, the Court in
Shaw opined that majority-minority districts, created from
geographically and politically disparate communities run the risk
133
of creating “political apartheid.” The Court stated that such
electoral districts reinforce “the perception that members of the
same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
134
at the polls.” Thus, the Court condemned such districts as
135
creating “impermissible racial stereotypes.”
But the Court did not stop there. In addition, such districts
also artificially balkanize citizens into conflicting polities,
exacerbate racial block voting and erode the democratic
representative process by signaling to elected representative that
“their primary obligation is to represent only the members of
136
that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.” Shaw’s
central claim is that segregation, not just racial classification
schemes, harms the polity. Shaw argues that segregation creates
profound systemic problems that are cognitive, process-based
and deliberative in nature. These harms transcend any particular
white plaintiff’s entitlement to a specific benefit or vested right,
the kinds of harms the Court is most concerned with in the
132. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
133. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
134. Id. at 647.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 648.
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traditional affirmative action context. Shaw takes place outside
of any merits-based determination; it speaks of the democracybased harms created by segregation. Moreover, Shaw suggests
that the gravity of those harms are so great that the normal
elements of Art. III standing, including the “injury in fact”
requirement is relaxed. Along these lines, consider Justice
White’s view in dissent that the claim recognized in Shaw (the
right to participate in a “colorblind” electoral process) did not
require that any particular voter demonstrate a constitutionally
137
cognizable injury.
Even if one takes the position that Shaw and Miller were
wrongly decided either because the cases unnecessarily
hamstring government’s ability to protect minority rights in a
winner take all political process and vindicate the aims of the
Voting Rights Act and/or because they relax normal standing
requirements, one must still acknowledge the harms associated
with segregation in the electoral districting context. As Elizabeth
Anderson has argued, racial segregation creates democracy138
based harms. The touchstone of democratic self-government is
reciprocal claim-making based on discussion and deliberation
139
among equal citizens. But spatial segregation, “exacerbated by
140
racial and partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts,”
undermines collective self-governance by manufacturing real
differences between people rather than a sense of unity. Under
conditions of segregation, people of different races really are
from different walks of life, with different and often adverse
141
political interests.
137. Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, a dramatically irregular shape is not
a necessary prerequisite for finding a Shaw violation. In Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995), the Court ruled that the government’s intent to segregate voters rather than
district shape was the essence of the harm recognized in Shaw. To be sure, like Shaw,
Miller is open to competing interpretations. It speaks to the impermissibility of racebased government action, but it also speaks to the separation that flows from such action.
Id. at 911 (“[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that the
State has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.”).
138. Elizabeth Anderson, The Future of Racial Integration 229, 235–36 in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (LAURENCE THOMAS ed., 2008).
139. Id. at 235.
140. Id.
141. Id. As Anderson puts it, since
the residents of the overwhelmingly white districts don’t benefit from public
spending in the other districts, the ordinary competition among districts for
public goods acquires a racial cast. The same lack of benefits means that
segregated blacks are less able to find coalition partners of other races. . . . A
politician in an overwhelmingly white district is free to advance policies that
have a grossly differential negative impact on disadvantaged racial groups,
without being held to account for the costs imposed on other racial groups, and
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The state’s motive in drawing the district boundary lines in
Shaw was not integrative. Instead, the state drew the lines to
come into compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and more
specifically to facilitate the “election of a member of a group
142
that lacks” electoral power. To be sure, Justice White is correct
that a “state’s compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly
143
constitutes a compelling interest.” The fact that the Court did
not affirm that understanding is deeply problematic. But Shaw
can also be read to stand for the proposition that segregation
itself poses special societal harms.
IV. SOLVING THE EXCLUSION/INCLUSION RIDDLE:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VISIBILITY OF DE FACTO
SEGREGATION
The Court is deeply divided about what segregation
“means” and/or whether de facto segregation has any
constitutional relevance at all. Perhaps because of this
uncertainty, the question of the constitutionality of the use of
racial preferences continues to percolate through the lower
144
federal courts. In Fisher v. University of Texas, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
University of Texas’ affirmative action plan did not violate the
145
equal protection clause. The affirmative action plan at issue in
Fisher was patterned largely on the affirmative action plan the
146
The Fifth Circuit
Court upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger.
explicitly relied on Grutter in reaching its conclusion to uphold
the University of Texas affirmative action plan against con147
stitutional challenge. But in a special concurrence, Judge
Emilio Garza urged the Supreme Court to overturn Grutter. The

possibly without even knowing the costs.
Id. at 235–36. But see Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099,
1102–05 (2005) (arguing that “democracy sometimes benefits from having
decisionmaking bodies that do not mirror the underlying population.” In the context of
electoral districting, Gerken highlights three benefits to electoral minorities of majorityminority districting: the ability to exert power normally reserved for the dominant group,
creation of a political space where the members of the majority experience the loss of
“comfort . . associated with their majority status,” and increased visibility “showcas[ing]
division and dissent within [the minority] groups”).
142. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 674 (White, J., dissenting).
144. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345).
145. Id. at 217
146. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 631 F.3d at 217–18.
147. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 218.
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special concurrence displays a judge struggling to apply binding
precedent that he believes is profoundly inconsistent with
148
while
“fundamental principles of constitutional law,”
simultaneously urging the high court to correct its profound
149
error. The Court’s recent decision to review the Fisher case
150
suggests that it is poised to address Judge Garza’s concerns.
151
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court took a permissive view
of the government’s ability to take account of racial imbalances
and a hostile view of segregation. At issue in Grutter was the
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s
affirmative action plan, which used race as a factor in making
152
admissions determinations. One of the purposes of the Law
School’s admissions plan was to achieve a “critical mass” of
minority law students so that “racial stereotypes lose their force
because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority
viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority
153
students.” Under the Law School’s affirmative action plan,
“critical mass” was never precisely defined. And evidence
adduced at trial indicated that there was a tight correlation
“between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of applicants
who are members of the three minority groups and the
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these
154
suggesting a “carefully managed program
same groups,”

148. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
149. Judge Garza’s concurrence reads much more like a dissent than a concurrence.
First, Judge Garza argued that Grutter is out of step with previously prevailing equal
protection doctrine, because it allowed for deferential rather than skeptical application of
strict scrutiny review. Id. at 249 (arguing that Grutter incorrectly redefined strict scrutiny
review). Thus, he asserted that Grutter is erroneous and fosters “a regime that
encourages opacity and is incapable of meaningful judicial review under any level of
scrutiny.” Id. But Judge Garza did not just focus on the Court’s relaxed application of
strict scrutiny review; he also attacked the Court’s holding that racial diversity is a
compelling interest in the higher education setting. Id. at 254–59. On Judge Garza’s view,
the Court was profoundly mistaken in finding that racial diversity amounts to a
compelling interest in the higher education context at least in part because some of the
benefits of such diversity were not education-specific. Id. at 257–58.
150. See Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/1100345qp.pdf (certifying the Question Presented as “[w]hether this Court’s decisions
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including
Grutter v. Bollinger, permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in
undergraduate admissions decisions”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
152. Id. at 311.
153. Id. at 318, 320.
154. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants
155
from selected minority groups.”
Thus, there were two possible ways to view the Law
School’s attempt to achieve critical mass: as an impermissible
attempt to achieve some preconceived notion of racial balance in
the Law School for its own sake, which is “patently uncon156
stitutional” or as the Court held, as an effort to achieve the
157
educational benefits of racial diversity in higher education. For
the Court, the reason why the Law School was not engaging in
racial balancing was because its use of race was intended to
achieve a variety of benefits, some that were specific to the
educational process and others that were external to that process
and which contribute to the greater good of society more
generally.
For instance, the Court described three interrelated types of
benefits provided by racial diversity. First, the Court explained
that racial diversity is a means of enhancing cross-racial
understanding and better educational outcomes within the Law
158
School. Next, the Court opined that racial diversity at the Law
School is a critical means of enhancing students’ ability to work
and thrive as citizens in a multi-racial environment after
159
graduation. Finally, the Court took the position that the Law
School is a leadership incubator; only a racially diverse law
school class can produce the multi-racial leadership necessary to
160
maintain a legitimate democracy in the 21st century. Only
opening up the Law School to students of different races and
backgrounds could provide these benefits. But however those
benefits were defined, the Court’s meta-focus was on
accessibility and inclusion: that the “diffusion of knowledge and
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must
161
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”
155. Id. at 386.
156. Id. at 330.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 330–32.
160. Id. at 332–33.
161. Id. at 331; see also Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger:
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV.
937, 951–52 (2008) (asserting that Grutter emphasizes the importance of inclusion of
minorities in higher education both because historically excluded minorities should have
access to the benefits of higher education as a form of remediation for past discrimination, and because their inclusion serves “to undercut the ugly message communicated about society generally by their exclusion from prominent public institutions:
that of a society still hopelessly rent by racial division, segregation and animosity”).
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If racial balance is sought for its own sake, it is
unconstitutional. But if the government’s goal is broadly
inclusionary, as the Law School’s was in Grutter, then the Court
is willing to dismiss the suggestion of impermissible racial
balancing. The trouble is that it is hard to tell the difference
between the two, and in Grutter the Court deferred to the Law
School that its underlying goal was racial diversity rather than
162
racial balancing. The Court allowed the government to use an
otherwise impermissible racial classification scheme to achieve
the result of racial inclusion. And, the Court deferred to the Law
School as to the importance and centrality of racial diversity to
its underlying educational goals. As I have written elsewhere,
the best explanation for the Court’s holding in Grutter is as an
163
embrace of integration. Stated differently, Grutter is about
undermining the exclusionary aspects of racial segregation. It
suggests that government may use racial classifications to openup previously closed racial hierarchies.
More recent precedent may undermine Grutter’s
enthusiastic embrace of racial integration and inclusion.
Consider Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
164
School District. At issue in Parents Involved, were two student
assignment plans that used race in an effort to racially diversify
165
the Seattle and Louisville public school districts. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the two student
assignment plans were not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental purpose and thus were unconstitu166
tional. In an opinion for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice
Roberts went even further and attacked the anti-segregative
rationale for the school districts’ plans as efforts to achieve racial
167
For Chief Justice Roberts, racial diversity,
balancing.
avoidance of racial isolation and racial integration all amounted
168
to the very same thing: impermissible racial balancing. Chief
Justice Roberts’ argument attempted to equate all efforts to
achieve racial integration and to overcome the effects of racial
isolation (otherwise known as segregation) with racial balancing.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALF. L. REV. 261, 286 (2006).
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 711.
Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 726.
Id.
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It is important to understand Chief Justice Roberts’
rhetorical maneuver. There is constitutional clarity about racial
balancing: it is impermissible. But, as discussed above, the Court
has taken differing and sometimes inconsistent views on racial
segregation. Thus, there is constitutional uncertainty about what
government can do to ameliorate racial segregation. Sometimes
government can use race to achieve racial diversity and enhance
racial integration. Sometimes the Court views racial classification schemes that are obviously segregative as particularly
virulent. At other times, the Court has acknowledged the
profound harms of segregation even as it has refused to
countenance integration-oriented remedies. There is an ongoing
debate within the Court about the meaning of racial segregation
and about what steps the government may take to eradicate it.
Indeed, this was the very essence of Justice Breyer’s Parents
Involved dissent, which emphasized the almost existential
difficulty posed by attempting to disentangle de jure from de
facto segregation. In particular, Justice Breyer attacked the
plurality’s position that because there had never been a judicial
finding of de jure segregation in Seattle, that any racial
imbalance in the Seattle public schools could not provide the
necessary predicate for a race-conscious student assignment
169
plan. On this view, racial concentrations untied to a court
ordered desegregation decree simply could not justify a racebased student assignment plan intended to remedy past
170
intentional discrimination.
Justice Breyer began from an entirely different premise: the
schools were segregated in fact and the Seattle school district
had been the defendant in a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional
171
segregation. Thus, for Justice Breyer, the presence of a court
ordered finding of de jure segregation was not necessary to
172
support the student assignment plan. Justice Breyer argued
that a court order should not take on talismanic significance
because government can facilitate, encourage, authorize or
otherwise take responsibility for segregation even where the
judiciary fails to affirm that fact. On this view, a court order does
the “work” of creating an artificial line demarcating de facto

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 720–21.
Id. at 808. That litigation ultimately settled. Id. at 810.
Id. at 844.
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from de jure segregation, but the distinction between the two is
far more elusive.
No one here disputes that Louisville’s segregation was de jure.
But what about Seattle’s? Was it de facto? De jure? A
mixture? Opinions differed. Or is it that a prior federal court
had not adjudicated the matter? Does that make a difference?
Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure
segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the school board
admitted? The plurality does not seem confident as to the
answer.
A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the crucial
variable. After all, a number of school districts in the South
that the Government or private plaintiffs challenged as
segregated by law voluntarily desegregated their schools
173
without a court order—just as Seattle did.

This argument is animated by the assertion that there is a
constitutional difference between governmental actions designed
174
to include versus those designed to exclude. Thus, strict
scrutiny review should not be fatal when a governmental entity
like the Seattle school district takes race-conscious steps to
“bring the races together,” rather than to “keep the races
175
apart.” Justice Breyer’s dissent supports the view that the
Court’s understanding of racial segregation is more nuanced and
unsettled than the Parents Involved plurality suggests.
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion attempts to
fill that constitutional void by reducing racial integration and/or
attempts to address racial segregation to the status of
impermissible racial balancing. From this perspective, “racial
balancing” is an ad hominem attack; a rhetorical trope that can
be used to eviscerate the most recent precedent affirming racial
integration: Grutter. Surely, the Law School’s action in Grutter
could have been ascribed to a desire to achieve racial balance for
176
its own sake. But the Grutter Court rejected that conclusion. If
Chief Justice Roberts’ view equating racial integration with

173. Id. at 821–22 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 830 (“I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional
asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include
members of minority races.”).
175. Id. at 829.
176. Indeed, that was the core of Justice Thomas’ argument in dissent. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (“How, then, is the Law School’s interest in these
allegedly unique educational ‘benefits’ not simply the forbidden interest in ‘racial
balancing,’ that the majority expressly rejects?”) (citation omitted).
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racial balancing were to command a majority of the Court,
Grutter v. Bollinger would almost certainly cease to be good law.
But Parents Involved can also be read to affirm Grutter.
Justice Kennedy did not join Chief Justice Roberts for crucial
parts of his analysis, robbing the Court of a majority for the most
far-reaching of his assertions. Instead, in a concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy explained that government may take race into
account in order to ensure that “all people have equal
177
opportunity regardless of their race.” Justice Kennedy opined
that the Constitution does not require public school districts to
178
“ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”
He then outlined a wide variety of facially race-neutral actions
that school districts could take with the overt race-conscious goal
179
of ameliorating racial segregation in the public schools. None
180
of these actions would trigger strict scrutiny review. But why
not? If the government were to take facially race-neutral actions
with an intent to segregate, there is little question that strict
scrutiny would not only apply but that such actions would be
181
struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection clause.
The answer has to be that segregation of whatever stripe
matters. In Parents Involved, neither school district was
attempting to take account of the effects of de jure segregation.
There was no de jure segregation to remedy. The central
question in the case turned on the constitutional status of
segregation: whether and to what extent public school districts
could take account of race in order to enhance racial diversity
and whether public school districts may use racial classifications
to “reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that
racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite
182
students from having access to the most desirable schools.”
Even after Parents Involved, school districts may take
overtly race-conscious steps—short of classifying individual
students by race—to ameliorate the harms of segregation for
which they are not legally responsible. Justice Kennedy
characterized the compelling interest at stake in perhaps the

177. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 789.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closing
county public schools while at the same time providing tuition grants and tax credits for
children to attend private segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause).
182. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725.

!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

34

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

5/31/2012 12:04 PM

[Vol. 28:1

most far-reaching way possible: a “compelling interest exists in
avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its
183
discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.” When Justice
Kennedy speaks of “avoiding racial isolation” it is hard to
believe that he is referring to Chief Justice Robert’s vision of
“racial imbalances.” And, at another point in his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy’s suggests that there is indeed a compelling
interest in remedying the harms that flow from de facto
184
segregation. Clearly, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas
and several members of the Court see this issue very differently.
For those justices, there is no “segregation” of which to take
account.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with two quotes. The first suggested that
185
The
de facto segregation was constitutionally irrelevant.
second suggested that government has a constitutionally
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation, that is, in
186
While much of the Court’s
addressing racial segregation.
doctrine can be read to comport with the first view, the Court
has often spoken explicitly about the evils of de facto racial
segregation as distinct from the harms associated with racial
classification schemes. In some contexts, the Court has
acknowledged that de facto segregation operates as a
particularly effective mechanism of exclusion, separating
individuals on the basis of race and preventing them from having
access to opportunity. This Article has argued that the Court has
evidenced far more concern about segregation as an
exclusionary and stigmatizing mechanism than many scholars
and commentators recognize. Thus, a very specific type of antisubordination value often animates the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence: a concern about the corrosive effects of racial
segregation.
Of course, current Courts are not always sensitive to the
concerns of past Courts, particularly if those concerns failed to
183. Id. at 797 (emphasis supplied).
184. Id. at 788 (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the
Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests
the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status
quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”).
185. See supra note 1.
186. See supra note 2.

!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RACIAL INCLUSION

5/31/2012 12:04 PM

35

consistently command five votes. Moreover, four (and at times
five) members of the current Court are on record as rejecting the
view that de facto segregation is constitutionally salient. For
those members of the Court, an Article such as this is unlikely to
affect their views.
But at the same time, this Article has demonstrated that the
Court’s view of segregation has not been monolithic; its view of
de facto segregation has been less static and more nuanced that
is commonly appreciated. As I have demonstrated, the Court has
often viewed de facto segregation with deep suspicion. This
theme or stand of equal protection jurisprudence is present, even
if it does not represent the Court’s holding in every case. Given
that, one argument is that the current Court should respect this
skeptical approach to de facto segregation. That is, the Court
should pay fealty to this tradition in equal protection, even if the
Court is not strickly bound by it as a matter of stare decisis. At
the very least, that Court should acknowledge this tradition
before it discards it. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Parents Involved suggests that he may be open to this line of
reasoning. Finally, this argument also provides ammunition for
other members of the Court to attempt to persuade their
colleagues when the Court revisits the question of affirmative
action in higher education next term in Fisher v. University of
187
Texas.

187. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345).

